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ABSTRACT
The weak response by the uninsured to policy initiatives encouraging voluntary enrollment in health
insurance has raised concerns regarding the extent to which the uninsured value health insurance.
To address this issue, we use data from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to examine the
association between health insurance preferences and coverage status. We also consider the role of
such preferences in decisions to seek out and enroll in employment-based coverage. We find that
adults with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are more likely than persons with
strong preferences to be uninsured and less likely to acquire coverage. Our econometric work
indicates that workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to obtain job offers with
insurance, reinforcing prior evidence that workers sort among jobs according to preferences for
coverage. We also find that workers with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to enroll in
offered coverage and we estimate the subsidy necessary to compensate such workers for the utility
loss were they to enroll. Our results suggest a dual approach to expanding coverage that includes
both subsidies and educational efforts to inform targeted groups among the uninsured about the value
of health insurance.
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I. Introduction 
 
Policy initiatives seeking to expand health insurance opportunities for uninsured 
Americans remain prominent on the public agenda.  Apart from the system-wide reform of the 
Clinton Administration’s Health Security Act of 1993, most initiatives over the last two decades 
have been incremental in nature, targeting specific groups among the uninsured and relying upon 
their voluntary participation.
1 Such proposals have typically been introduced with high 
expectations of success.  However, past evidence from demonstration projects, simulations of 
responses by the uninsured to proposed subsidies, and experience with public insurance 
expansions suggest that the response by targeted groups may be disappointing.  These findings 
also indicate that large subsidies may be required to induce participation in private coverage and 
that intensive outreach efforts may be necessary to overcome informational and administrative 
impediments to enrollment in public coverage (Bilheimer and Colby 2001; Gruber and Levitt 
2000; McLaughlin and Zellers 1992; Thorpe et al. 1992; Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1999; 
Marquis and Long, 1995).      
The lack of responsiveness to such coverage initiatives has perplexed researchers and 
policymakers alike who justify the value of expanded health insurance along several dimensions. 
These include the ‘merit good’ aspect of health insurance; the negative externalities from 
underconsumption of medical care; the financing burden on taxpayers and public institutions 
                                                 
1 Included among such proposed and enacted legislation are the Medicaid expansions of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) of 1997, 
tax credits for the purchase of individual heath insurance in the Health Coverage Tax Credits 
program of the Trade Act of 2002, the proposed Fair Care for the Uninsured Act of 2003, and 
state premium support programs for employment-based coverage, as well as small group and 
individual health insurance market reform.  In contrast to these voluntary efforts, Massachusetts 
recently enacted an individual mandate requiring all citizens to obtain health insurance. 
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from providing care directly to the uninsured; the impact on health care expenditures from the 
provision of services in inappropriate settings; and the implications for the health of the 
uninsured from financial barriers to the timely receipt of care.   
From a policymaker’s perspective, the points noted above may be reasonable rationales 
for expanded coverage.  However, the weak responsiveness of the uninsured, both actual and 
simulated, has raised the issue of whether targeted groups value health insurance relative to other 
uses of income, or perceive the benefits of public coverage to be commensurate with any direct 
and indirect costs of participation.  Indeed, in their review of evidence regarding enrollment into 
a variety of public programs, Remler, Rachlin, and Gleid (2001) note that “[i]t may well be that 
potential recipients do not value health insurance as strongly as policy analysts do -- a possibility 
worth exploring in depth.” (p.15). Bilheimer and Colby (2001) also acknowledge that “instilling 
awareness of the value of health insurance” is an important component of strategies to enroll and 
retain persons eligible for private or public insurance programs.   Finally, Peterson (2004) notes 
that among the ‘stark lessons’ learned regarding state efforts to expand insurance coverage is that 
“because many . . . do not understand or are skeptical about the value of insurance, offering 
coverage does not translate into people accepting it” (p. 174). 
While individual valuation of health insurance is fundamental for approaches that would 
encourage voluntary participation in private and public health insurance, it also has important 
implications for proposals to mandate employment-sponsored health insurance (ESI).  As 
Summers (1989) has observed, mandated approaches may be more efficient than alternative tax-
based approaches provided that workers fully value the mandated benefits.  Thus, understanding 
the extent to which targeted populations value health insurance can not only affect the success of  
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particular policy instruments but may also govern selection of which instrument to apply.
2 
Finally, from a methodological perspective, individual tastes for coverage underlie the 
demand relationship for health insurance.  Such demand estimation requires that tastes for 
coverage (or reasonable proxies) be held constant in order to obtain unbiased estimates of price 
and income effects. For example, estimates of price effects for enrolling in ESI may be 
overstated should workers with strong preferences for coverage sort into firms with more 
favorable out-of-pocket premium costs.  In empirical work, such tastes are frequently represented 
by individual characteristics such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment.
3  
However, analysts have little sense of whether these commonly used proxies display any 
relationship to an individual’s tastes for coverage.  More to the point, Pudney (1989) has 
cautioned that “. . . not all variation in preferences is likely to be explicable solely in terms of 
observed demographic and social factors.” (page 34).  
In this paper, we examine several aspects of the relationship between preferences for 
health insurance and decisions to seek out and enroll in ESI.  Using self-reported attitudinal 
measures from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), we consider the extent to 
which individuals with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance are more likely to be 
                                                 
2  As another example, efforts to expand access to coverage through reform of the small 
group insurance market may not be effective if workers employed by small firms have weak 
preferences for coverage. 
 
3 For example, Blumberg and Nichols (2004) note that in empirical estimates of the 
demand for health insurance, factors such as age, health status, gender, and family status among 
others are used as proxies for unobserved aversion to risk.  In modeling the decision to 
participate in nongroup coverage, Marquis and Long (1995) include income, education, and the 
spouse’s employment status as ￿measures . . hypothesized to reflect the family’s aversion to risk 
and so the value the family attaches to the purchase of insurance.” (pages 53-54). 
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uninsured than those with strong preferences.  Focusing on workers, we apply econometric 
models to examine whether single workers and married couples with weak or uncertain 
preferences are more likely than those with strong preferences to sort into jobs without health 
insurance and are less likely to enroll in offered coverage.  In doing so, we compute the 
reduction in out-of pocket premium costs that would be needed to offset the disutility from 
enrollment by those with weak or uncertain preferences for coverage.  
Our findings reveal that persons with weak or uncertain preferences for coverage are 
more likely to be uninsured than those with strong preferences. Depending on the type of 
preference measure used, we find that single workers and couples (with at least one worker) 
having weak or uncertain preferences for coverage are less likely than those with strong 
preferences to obtain offers of ESI and to enroll. Our results are consistent with a dual approach 
to expanding coverage that includes both subsidies and educational efforts to inform targeted 
groups among the uninsured about the value of health insurance. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a brief review of research on 
the role of health insurance preferences in coverage decisions and outline our analytical 
framework. We describe our data and empirical specification in Section III.  In Section IV, we 
present descriptive tabulations of the prevalence of weak or uncertain health insurance 
preferences, their association with health insurance status, and with the offer and take up of ESI. 
Our econometric results regarding job sorting and enrollment decisions are presented in Section 
V and our conclusions are stated in Section VI. 
 
II. Background and Analytical Framework  
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Previous research on the role of health insurance preferences 
It has long been recognized that worker preferences for health insurance are likely to 
underlie decisions by employers to provide health insurance. For example, early work by 
Goldstein and Pauly (1976) first explicitly posited that workers sort among alternative 
employment opportunities according to their tastes for health insurance and subsequent work 
(e.g., Pauly 1986; Feldman et al. 1997) has also acknowledged such behavior.   However, these 
studies did not provide empirical tests of the sorting hypothesis.  Most recently, workforce 
characteristics (such as age, gender, and wage distribution), presumed to impart information 
about health insurance preferences, have been used to explore the role of worker preferences in 
employer decisions regarding the content of health insurance benefits (e.g., Moran, Chernew, 
and Hirth 2001; Bundorf 2002; Gruber and Lettau 2004).
To date, there have been only a few papers that have explored the role of health insurance 
preferences on the employment and health insurance decisions by individuals and households.  
Long and Marquis (1992) inferred that weak preferences for health insurance may contribute to 
the low take-up rates by young and low-wage workers as they found that the characteristics of 
workers who turn down offered coverage resembled those of workers in jobs that failed to offer 
coverage.  Using a constructed measure of risk tolerance from the Health and Retirement Survey, 
Barsky et al. (1997) found that more risk tolerant individuals were less likely to have health 
insurance.  Additionally, they found that for employed persons, “risk tolerance . . . seems to be 
an important factor sorting individuals into jobs with health insurance” (p.556). Using responses 
to questions regarding attitudes toward health insurance from the 1987 National Medical 
Expenditure Survey (NMES), Monheit and Vistnes (1999) found that weak preferences for  
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coverage were an important factor in decisions by single wage earners to sort into jobs without 
health insurance.  Their analysis also suggested the presence of ‘imperfect sorting’ as a sizeable 
proportion (29 percent) of such workers failed to obtain jobs consistent with their preferences for 
coverage. Hirth et al. (2005), using data from the 2003 Community Tracking Survey, also found 
evidence consistent with imperfect labor market sorting.  Based on predicted probabilities of 
coverage, they estimated that 20.4 percent of workers were ‘mismatched’ with regard to their 
health insurance preferences and employer offers of health insurance.  Finally, among the self 
employed, Monheit and Harvey (1993) applied NMES attitudinal data and found that those with 
weak tastes for health insurance were less likely to obtain ESI or to provide such coverage to 
wage earners in their employ.  Additionally, Barsky et al. (1997) found that the self employed 
had high tolerance for risk and on average, were less likely to be insured than wage earners.   
Analytical approach 
As noted earlier, our examination of the role of preferences for coverage in health 
insurance enrollment decisions focuses on decisions by workers to seek out and enroll in ESI.  
First, we consider whether single workers and married couples (with at least one working 
spouse) sort among jobs that offer or fail to offer health insurance according to their preferences 
for coverage.  Next, given the decision to obtain a job that provides coverage, we examine the 
role played by preferences and other factors in the decision to take up offered coverage.  
i. Obtaining a job offer with health insurance 
To examine the first process, we apply and extend the simple model of job search for 
single workers from our earlier work (Monheit and Vistnes, 1999).  In this model, we posit that 
when selecting a job, an individual will compare the utility of jobs that offer or fail to offer  
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health insurance and select the former if its utility exceeds that of a job offer without health 
insurance. The utility of each job is characterized by wage income, search costs, expected out-of-
pocket medical expenses (which depend on whether the job provides health insurance), and 
preferences for health insurance (which affect the position and shape of the individual’s utility 
function). We include search costs in the model as such costs may impede some workers from 
obtaining their desired jobs and thus may contribute to imperfect sorting according to health 
insurance preferences.   
As shown in Monheit and Vistnes (1999), the above comparison based upon linear utility 
functions yields the following estimating equation (subscripts O and N indicate jobs that offer/do 
not offer health insurance, and S and W indicate strong or weak preferences): 
Prob (job with health insurance) = -￿(WN - WO) + ￿MN + ￿(TS - TW) - ￿(CO - CN) > (eN - eO).
This probability is negatively related to the gain in wage income between jobs without and with 
coverage (WN - WO) and positively related to factors associated with the increase in out-of-
pocket medical expenditures (MN) if the job does not offer coverage.
4 This probability decreases 
as search costs for a job with coverage increase relative to the costs of finding a job without 
coverage (CO - CN).  Since workers with weak preferences for coverage (TW = 1, TS = 0) obtain 
higher utility from a job without insurance than from one with coverage, they will be more likely 
to obtain the former while those with strong preferences will be more likely to obtain the latter.
5  
                                                 
4 We assume that (WN - WO) > 0 as workers bear all or some of the employer contribution to 
premium costs associated with health insurance. We also assume that jobs with health insurance 
provide full coverage and hence, zero out-of-pocket medical costs. 
 
5 Our empirical work also considers uncertain preferences for coverage. For ease of exposition, 
we present our model in terms of strong and weak preferences. 
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We assume (eN - eO) to have a logistic distribution and estimate the model as a logit equation. 
This model also guides our empirical specification of job sorting for married couples 
using the household as the unit of observation.
6  Here we consider whether a household with at 
least one working spouse is observed to have a job offer with health insurance and focus on the 
role played by spousal preferences for coverage.
7  Household utility, which depends upon the 
aggregate wage income obtained by the couple, the costs associated with the couple’s job search, 
family out-of-pocket medical expenses, and spousal preferences for coverage, is compared 
across jobs with and without health insurance that are available to the couple. The household 
obtains at least one job with health insurance if the utility from taking such a job for at least one 
spouse exceeds that from neither spouse obtaining a job with coverage. This comparison yields 
the following decision rule: 
Prob (household will obtain a job with health insurance) = 
-￿(WN - WO) + ￿MN + ￿ (TS - TW - TWS) - ￿(CO - CN)] > (eN - eO).  This probability is negatively 
related to the first term in the bracket (the potential wage gain for the couple from not taking any 
jobs with coverage) and positively related to the second term (the household’s exposure to out-
of-pocket medical expenses for households without health insurance). The third term represents 
                                                 
6  See Monheit and Vistnes (2005) and Monheit, Schone, and Taylor (1999) for analyses of 
health insurance decision making that use the household as the unit of observation.  
 
7 We consider whether the couple obtains a job offer with health insurance (through either 
spouse) and enrolls in offered coverage. In doing so, we take the labor supply decisions of each 
spouse as given, recognizing this to be the outcome of a complex and interdependent decision 
process regarding each spouse’s labor force participation, hours of work, and access to ESI. It is 
beyond the scope of our analysis to model such decision making. Consequently, we estimate 
reduced form models of the household’s offer and take-up decisions based on exogenous 
characteristics of the couple and their family members.  
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household preferences for health insurance with TS indicating that both spouses have strong 
preferences for coverage (positively related to the probability of obtaining coverage), TW 
indicating both spouses have weak preferences, and TWS representing households with ‘mixed’ 
spousal preferences for health insurance (both negatively related to this probability).
8  The last 
term on the left-hand side is the respective costs to the household of searching for a job with 
coverage (increases in such costs reduce the probability of a job with coverage).  Assuming (eN - 
eO) is logistically distributed, we fit such an equation for the household as a logit model.   
ii. Preferences and the decision to enroll in offered coverage 
To estimate the role of health insurance preferences on the decision to enroll in offered 
coverage, we next consider a simple model of insurance participation. For single workers, let 
UI(YI, P; T) + eI represent the utility from insurance and UN = UN(YN, M; T) + eN,  represent the 
utility from not obtaining health insurance.  In these equations YI  and YN represent income in the 
insured and uninsured states,  M represents out-of-pocket medical expenses when uninsured 
(assumed to be zero when insured), P represents out-of-pocket premium costs, T represents 
preferences for coverage, and eI and  eN are stochastic error terms. An individual will enroll if 
UI(YI, P; T) - UN(YN, M; T) > eN - eI. Expressing this difference as a simple linear function of Y, 
P, and the difference in tastes, TS, and TW, we obtain the rule for the probability of enrollment:   
P(enrollment) = UI(YI, P; T) - UN(YN, M; T) = ￿Y - ￿P  + ￿M + ￿(TS - TW)  > (eN - eI).   
This probability increases with income, decreases with higher premiums, increases with expected 
                                                 
8 As in our model for single workers, the preference variables are mutually exclusive. We 
hypothesize that compared to both spouses having strong preferences for health insurance, 
households in which spouses disagree about the value of coverage (e.g., one spouse with strong 
preferences and the other with weak preferences) will experience a reduction in utility from a job 
with health insurance and thus will be less likely to obtain an offer of coverage.   
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medical expenditures, increases for individuals with strong preferences for coverage and 
decreases for individuals with weak preferences.  Assuming (eN - eI) to be logistically 
distributed, coefficient estimates will be derived from a logit equation of the likelihood of 
enrollment.  
  This framework also motivates our empirical work on enrollment decisions by 
households with married couples. In this case, utility is defined for the couple with Y 
representing aggregate household income, M representing family out-of-pocket medical care 
expenses, and P representing the lowest premium available to the household from the coverage 
offered. As before, tastes are represented by whether both spouses have strong, weak, or mixed 
preference for coverage. The couple will choose to enroll in offered coverage if: 
P(enrollment) = UI(YI, P; T) - UN(YN, M; T)  = ￿Y - ￿P  + ￿M + ￿(TS - TW - TWS)  > (eN - eI). 
Households with weak or mixed preferences are less likely than those with strong preferences to 
enroll in offered coverage.  As with single workers, the probability of enrollment increases with 
family income and expected out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and is reduced by higher 
premium costs.  
Finally, in both our analyses of individual workers and couples, the marginal effect of a 
$1 increase in premiums on enrollment (￿
*) together with the marginal effect on enrollment due 
to the presence of weak preferences (￿
*) will be used to assess the magnitude of the decline in 
out-of-pocket premiums necessary to encourage enrollment.
9  Note that each dollar decline in 
                                                 
9 Marginal effects are derived from the estimated premium and preference coefficients in 
the enrollment equation. As Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) note, the estimated price 
effect from such an equation can provide an estimate of the subsidy necessary to induce 
participation and is equivalent to the compensating variation measure of welfare loss under a 
health insurance mandate.  
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premium P increases the utility from enrollment relative to non-enrollment by ￿
* units (i.e., the 
utility gain per dollar price reduction) and persons with weak preferences for coverage 
experience a decrease in utility from enrolling of ￿
*. A price reduction of ￿
*/￿
* units will offset 
the effect of weak preferences on the likelihood of enrollment by the single worker or couple.   
III. Data and Empirical Specification       
The data used in this study are from the 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), a nationally representative two-year household panel survey sponsored by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  MEPS provides national estimates of the civilian, 
noninstitutionalized population’s access to, use of, and expenditures for health care, their health 
and health insurance status, demographic characteristics, economic status, and employment and 
job characteristics.  The survey also includes questions on respondent attitudes toward health 
insurance, risk-taking behavior, and the medical care system contained in a self-administered 
questionnaire (SAQ) asked of adults around the time of the round 2/4 household interview. The 
2001 MEPS includes approximately 14,000 households consisting of nearly 33,500 individuals.   
For this analysis, our full sample consists of 14,420 individuals (workers and non-
workers, excluding full-time students) ages 18 to 64 who responded directly to the SAQ (we 
excluded proxy respondents).
10  For our analysis of job search and enrollment decisions, we 
further limit our sample to single wage earners and couples with at least one working spouse.  In 
both cases, the sample consists of persons/couples ages 18-54.  We constrained the upper age 
limit to 54 in order to avoid complications associated with individuals having other ESI through 
                                                 
10 Ignoring the proxy constraint yields a sample of 16,151observations.  In comparison, 
our analysis sample was slightly more likely to be female (53.9 percent to 50.8 percent) and less 
likely to have less than a high school education (15.4 percent to 16.5 percent).   
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a retired spouse or a prior retirement job.  For similar reasons, we also excluded 217 observations 
with coverage from a job other than their current main job (e.g., through COBRA or another job 
held at the same time) or with military coverage (e.g.,TRICARE). The resulting sample of single 
wage earners consists of 3,207 persons.
11  Finally, we restricted our sample of couples to those 
where each spouse individually responded to the SAQ (that is, we excluded couples if one 
spouse’s response was reported by a proxy, typically the other spouse).  Our resulting sample 
consists of 1,954 couples where both spouses responded to the SAQ and at least one spouse was 
employed as a wage earner.
12   In all analyses of workers our data exclude the self employed. 
All estimates presented have been weighted using the MEPS-SAQ weight and standard 
errors have been adjusted for the complex sample design of MEPS.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
all findings reported in the text are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 percent level. 
Health insurance preferences 
  Respondents to the MEPS-SAQ are asked whether they agree strongly, somewhat, are 
uncertain, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following four attitudinal statements 
regarding health insurance, risk, and the medical care system: 1) I’m healthy enough that I really 
don’t need health insurance; 2) Health insurance is not worth the money it costs; 3) I’m more 
likely to take risks than the average person; 4) I can overcome illness without help from a 
                                                 
11  MEPS included 3,443 unmarried wage earners ages 18-54 with SAQ data who were 
not students.  Elimination of proxy respondents reduced this to 3,207 wage earners.  There were 
no statistically significant differences by demographic characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, 
income, and educational attainment between the full sample and our analytical sample. 
12 There were 2,676 married couples with SAQ data where each spouse was 18 to 54 
years of age and both were not students, and at least one spouse was a wage earner. Eliminating 
proxy respondents reduced the sample size to 1,954 couples.  Compared to all such couples in 
the MEPS, our analytical sample exhibited no differences in demographic characteristics.   
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medically trained person.  The first two statements are directly related to an individual’s 
preferences for health insurance and capture different aspects of its value.  In contrast, the last 
two statements provide indirect measures that are likely to be associated with attitudes toward 
health insurance.  Finally, it is important to note that responses to these attitudinal questions were 
obtained independently of survey questions regarding health insurance status (i.e., through a 
separate survey instrument) thus mitigating concerns that responses indicating weak preferences 
for coverage might be a rationale for lacking coverage. 
Considering each of the attitudinal statements independently, respondents who strongly 
or somewhat agree with a specific statement are classified as having weak preferences for 
coverage.  Those who respond that they are uncertain with regard to a specific statement are 
classified as having uncertain preferences, while those who strongly or somewhat disagree with a 
specific statement are considered to have strong preferences for coverage.  
For married couples, we consider responses to each of the attitudinal statements by both 
spouses in order to characterize the couple’s preferences.
13   We classify couples as having 
strong preferences for coverage only if both spouses report strong preferences.  Similarly, we 
classify couples as having weak preferences if both spouses have weak preferences and couples 
as having uncertain preferences if both spouses report they are uncertain with regard to the 
attitudinal statements.  We also consider three separate categories of ‘mixed’ preferences 
consisting of couples with weak/strong preferences, weak/uncertain preferences, and 
                                                 
13 We assume that the preferences of each spouse are treated equally in household 
decisions regarding health insurance.  Thus, we do not construct household preference indicators 
by applying any weighting scheme to each spouse’s preferences (e.g., counting those working or 
contributing higher income to the household as having more input in decision making).    
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strong/uncertain preferences.  
Finally, we include two additional variables in our specifications that also impart 
information about attitudes toward health risk.  The first variable is a dichotomous measure of 
whether an individual is a smoker.  In addition to information on an individual’s health status, 
this variable may convey information about attitudes regarding risk-taking behavior with respect 
to health.  For single workers, this is simply an indicator of whether or not the individual 
smokes; for couples, the variable measures whether either spouse is a smoker. The second 
variable is another indirect measure of health risk obtained through responses to a question 
regarding seatbelt use.  For single persons, we include several measures of seatbelt use (whether 
the individual uses seatbelts always (the omitted category), nearly always, sometime, seldom, or 
never), and for couples, we construct three measures indicating whether both spouses never use 
seatbelts, always use seatbelts (the omitted category), or whether there is some combination of 
the remaining responses.    
Specification of econometric models 
In addition to the variables described above, our empirical models of job search and 
enrollment draw upon the following data.  In our model of job search, we assume that the wage 
differential (gain) from taking a job without health insurance will be positively related to the 
costs of health insurance. We proxy variation in health insurance costs through the inclusion of 
the worker’s occupation, region of residence, urban or rural locale, and the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services’ hospital wage index.
 Additionally, as in Monheit and Vistnes (1999), we 
note that workers receiving more generous health plans (such as older, more experienced, and 
better educated workers) may obtain a larger wage gain by taking a job without coverage  
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compared to other workers. We also assume that out-of-pocket medical expenses (MN) depend 
on the health status of individuals, the number of children in the household, and whether any 
children or parents are eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP.
   
As regards the difference in search costs for jobs with and without coverage, we use 
proxy variables such as the county unemployment rate from the Area Resource File (higher 
unemployment rates may increase the costs of search for job offers with coverage) and the 
proportion of establishments in the worker’s county of residence with less than 10 employees 
and between 10 and 19 employees from Department of Commerce’s County Business Patterns 
data base (we posit that search costs for jobs with health insurance rise and for jobs without 
coverage fall as there are more small employers in the county).  Older (presumably more 
experienced) and more educated workers/couples may also have easier access to jobs with ESI 
than those who are younger or less educated and therefore, have lower search costs for jobs with 
insurance offers.  In addition, despite limits on insurers’ use of pre-existing health conditions, 
workers with health problems may also incur additional search costs to find jobs for which they 
may be eligible for coverage.  
 
A key component of our analysis of enrollment in offered coverage is to assess how the 
explicit use of preference measures affects participation in ESI and whether price and income 
responsiveness changes when health insurance preferences are excluded. To assess price 
responsiveness, we constructed state/establishment size-specific means of employee out-of-
pocket premium costs derived from establishment-level data in the MEPS Insurance Component 
(IC).  We matched person-level data from the MEPS Household Component to area-specific 
estimates (mean values of employee out-of-pocket contributions) from the IC based upon state  
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and establishment size.  For analyses of both single workers and married couples, we examine 
the impact of changes in out-of-pocket contributions for single coverage which represents the 
lowest price a household confronts in order to participate in ESI.
 14   
Since some of the variation in such costs may reflect geographic and firm size differences 
in health insurance benefits and payment provisions, we also included variables accounting for 
the presence of particular insurance provisions by state and establishment size in preliminary 
econometric specifications.  However, since such variables were correlated with the premium 
data, their inclusion yielded statistically insignificant premium coefficients in our enrollment 
equations.  In addition, the coefficients on most of the benefit variables were themselves 
statistically insignificant.  Further, the statistically significant coefficients on the physician co-
payment variable obtained inconsistent signs across the single and married worker enrollment 
equations. Consequently, we excluded the benefit variables from our enrollment equations. Thus, 
variation in our estimates of premium contributions may reflect some differences in the quantity 
or quality of insurance provided.  Finally, our models of enrollment decisions include family-
level characteristics, including family income (as a percent of the federal poverty line), the 
number of children, and the presence of possible alternatives to ESI, measured by the number of 
children predicted to be eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP and whether a parent is eligible. 
  
IV. Descriptive Findings  
Prevalence of weak preferences 
                                                 
14 For couples with two workers who were both offered coverage, we selected the 
employee contribution of the spouse with the lowest single contribution. 
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Overall, we find that persons reporting weak preferences represent a minority of all adults 
and that the prevalence of such preferences is lowest for the response to the statement ‘healthy 
enough, don’t need coverage’ (9.0 percent of adults). We find that over a fifth of respondents 
report weak preferences for health insurance based on the other measures.  Were we to add the 
prevalence of uncertain preferences to these tabulations (so that we consider all adults without 
strong preferences for coverage), the tabulations would increase to 14.5 percent with weak or 
uncertain preferences based upon ‘healthy enough, don’t need coverage,’ 34.4 percent based 
upon ‘health insurance is not worth the cost,’ 35.8 percent for ‘more likely to take risks,’ and 
33.8 percent for the ‘overcome illness’ statement.   
In Table 1, we examine the association between health insurance status and preferences 
for coverage. In panel A, we consider whether persons with weak or uncertain preferences are 
more likely to be uninsured all year compared to persons with strong preferences.  For the two 
direct preference measures, we find that the former groups are more than twice as likely as the 
latter to be uninsured throughout 2001.  Persons reporting weak or uncertain preferences in 
response to the indirect ‘take risk’ statement had roughly the same likelihood of being uninsured 
all year and are seven to eight percentage points more likely to lack coverage than persons with 
strong preferences.  Finally, we also observe small but statistically significant differences in the 
likelihood of being uninsured all year for persons who report weak or uncertain preferences in 
response to the ‘overcome illness’ statement compared to those with strong preferences.
15 
                                                 
15  These tabulations raise the issue of whether such attitudes toward health insurance are simply 
a correlate of other factors more directly associated with ability to pay or to otherwise obtain 
access to coverage. To address this issue, we estimated multinomial logistic regressions with 
health insurance status (insured all year, part year, or uninsured all year) as the outcome variable 
(results available upon request). We found that adults with weak preferences were more likely to  
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Next (panel B), we consider persons uninsured during January 2001 and examine 
whether those with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely than persons with strong 
preferences to ever acquire coverage during the remainder of the calendar year.  For our two 
direct measures of health insurance preferences, we find that among such uninsured persons, 
32.7 percent of those with strong health insurance preferences (in response to ‘healthy, don’t 
need coverage’) acquired coverage compared to only 23.1 percent of those with weak 
preferences and roughly a fifth of those with uncertain preferences.  Additionally, 34.9 percent of 
adults uninsured during January reporting strong preferences (in response to the ‘too costly’ 
statement) acquired coverage compared to only 24.9 percent of those with weak preferences and 
25.2 percent of those with uncertain preferences.  In contrast, using the indirect preference 
measures, we find no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of acquiring health 
insurance between persons with weak/uncertain preferences and those with strong preferences 
(in response to the ‘take risk’ statement). However, we find that uninsured adults with strong 
preferences (in response to the ‘overcome illness’ statement) are more likely to acquire coverage 
than those with weak preferences.     
Health insurance preferences, offers of coverage, and enrollment 
In Table 2, we provide descriptive data on whether wage earners with weak or uncertain 
preferences for health insurance are less likely to obtain or “sort” into jobs that offer coverage 
compared to those with strong preferences, and whether the former groups are also less likely to 
enroll in offered coverage.  For single workers we examine offers of insurance from the worker’s 
current main job and enrollment in such coverage.  For couples, we examine whether either 
                                                                                                                                                             
be uninsured all year (relative to being insured all year) compared  to adults with strong 
preferences, holding age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, education, and health status constant.   
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spouse received an offer from their current main job and whether either spouse enrolled in such 
coverage.  To conserve space, and as a prelude to our econometric analysis, we examine the two 
direct preference measures and the ‘take’ risk measure. Among single workers and couples, we 
find striking evidence consistent with these differences in behavior.  Using the direct preference 
measures, we find that single workers and couples with weak or uncertain preferences are less 
likely to obtain jobs with coverage or to enroll in offered coverage than those with strong 
preferences.   Using the ‘take risk’ measure, we also find that single workers and married couples 
with weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to obtain job offers with health insurance than 
their counterparts with strong preferences.  However, as regards enrollment, we only find 
couples with uncertain preferences to be less likely to take up coverage than those with strong 
preferences.  
Presence of imperfect sorting 
While the descriptive statistics of Table 2 are consistent with worker sorting by health 
insurance preferences, we also find such sorting to be imperfect. For example, using  the 
‘healthy, don’t need coverage’ measure and considering single wage earners ages 18 to 54 who 
either reported strong or weak preferences, we find that 28.2 percent of such workers are 
mismatched, having preferences for coverage that are inconsistent with the availability of 
coverage at their jobs.  Of this total, 18.9 percent of such workers have strong preferences for 
coverage and are without jobs that provide insurance, while 9.3 percent have weak preferences 
but are offered coverage. Among couples ages 18-54 with at least one working spouse and where 
both spouses either report strong or both report weak preferences, we find that only 7.6 percent 
are mismatched: Five percent of such couples have strong preferences and obtain jobs that fail to  
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offer coverage while 2.6 percent of couples have weak preferences and obtain jobs offering 
coverage. The lower prevalence of such mismatches among couples may reflect the fact that 
when both spouses are employed, more opportunities are present to obtain jobs consistent with 
the couple’s health insurance preferences. 
As noted in our earlier work (Monheit and Vistnes 1999), such findings, especially for 
single workers, raise the issue of whether search costs, human capital, or other impediments to 
jobs preclude some workers from obtaining jobs that meet their preferences for coverage. 
Despite strong preferences, some workers may lack the requisite human capital to obtain job 
offers with coverage, while other workers with weak preferences but substantial human capital 
may find it difficult to avoid employment in jobs that do not offer coverage. 
 
V. Econometric Results 
In this section, we apply the empirical models described in Section II to examine the role 
of preferences and other factors in decisions to seek out and enroll in ESI.  Using logit models, 
we first examine the likelihood of obtaining a job offering ESI and next, we model the decision 
to enroll in offered coverage.  We estimate these models on single workers (Table 3) and on 
married couples (Table 4). We present findings for each of the direct preference measures. Since 
findings for the indirect preference measures were not as robust, we limit the presentation of our 
results to the ‘take risk’ measure.
16  We report marginal effects (percentage point changes) 
                                                 
16 We fit separate equations for each of the preference measures to avoid any problems 
associated with correlation among these measures. For models using the ‘overcome illness’ 
preference measure, we found no effect of preferences in estimates of insurance offers. In 
estimates of the take-up equation, only weak preferences (for single workers p < 0.10) and 
combined weak/strong preferences for couples were statistically significant.  
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associated with changes in specific variables as well as the corresponding decline in baseline 
offer and enrollment rates.
17 Unless otherwise indicated, logit coefficients are statistically 
significant at p < 0.05 or better for a two-tailed test. 
Single workers 
Results presented in Table 3 indicate that preferences for health insurance play a role in 
decisions by single workers to obtain jobs that offer health insurance and to enroll in offered 
coverage.
18 Considering responses to ‘healthy, don’t need coverage,’ those with weak or 
uncertain preferences are 6.15 and 8.43 percentage points less likely to obtain an offer of 
coverage than persons with strong preferences.  We also find that workers reporting weak or 
uncertain preferences in response to ‘health insurance is not worth the cost’ are 4.10 and 6.34 
percentage points less likely to obtain jobs with health insurance compared to those with strong 
preferences.  In addition, we find some evidence that single individuals who report being risk 
takers are 2.98 percentage points less likely to obtain jobs with health insurance (coefficient 
significant at p < 0.10). Finally, we also find evidence that other measures of attitudes toward 
risk are associated with a reduced likelihood of obtaining a job with health insurance. In 
particular, we find that single persons who smoke and those who nearly always or seldom use 
                                                 
17  Marginal probabilities were obtained for discrete variables by first assuming each 
observation to have the characteristic of interest (e.g., parent is eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP), 
predicting the probability of any ESI or enrollment and averaging.  The same procedure was used 
assuming each observation did not have the characteristic of interest.  The difference between 
predicted mean probabilities with and without the characteristic of interest represents the 
marginal effect associated with that characteristic.  For continuous variables, the marginal effect 
was calculated for each observation and then averaged. 
 
18 While the sample and use of preference variables differ somewhat, our findings are 
consistent with those from Monheit and Vistnes (1999).  
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seatbelts are 6.50,  6.44 and 9.65 percentage points less likely to obtain such jobs compared to 
non-smokers and those who always wear seatbelts (results reported from the ‘don’t need’ 
model). 
To put these marginal effects in perspective, we consider their impact as a percent of the 
baseline offer rate of 75.2 percent.  Having weak or uncertain preferences in response to ‘healthy 
don’t need coverage’ yields a decline in the offer rate of 8.18 and 11.21 percent respectively, 
while having weak or uncertain preferences in response to the ‘too costly’ measure yields a 5.45 
and 8.43 percent decline.  By comparison, we find that persons with 12 years of education are 
7.15 percentage points less likely to obtain a job with coverage than those with 16 years, 
resulting in a 9.51 percent decline in the baseline offer rate. In addition, being a non-smoker or 
seldom wearing a seatbelt results in an 8.64 and 12.83 percent decline. 
Other variables in each of the logit equations are consistent with the underlying search 
model (full results available upon request).  Single workers facing higher search costs for jobs 
with health insurance, such as those in fair/poor health compared to adults in excellent, very 
good, or good health, those residing in counties with higher proportions of small employers 
(establishments with less than 10 employees), and those in counties with higher unemployment 
rates are less likely to obtain jobs with insurance. However, the coefficients on the latter two 
variables were not statistically significant.  Single workers expected to have lower out-of-pocket 
medical expenses, such as younger workers, those who have children predicted to be eligible for 
Medicaid/SCHIP, or who themselves are predicted to be eligible are less likely to have jobs 
offering coverage, while adults expecting to incur higher medical expenditures, such as those 
with more children, are more likely to obtain jobs with coverage.  Finally, we find that better  
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educated workers (those graduating or with some years in college) are more likely to obtain jobs 
with health insurance, reflecting their lower costs of searching for such jobs, given their human 
capital, and perhaps their greater willingness to invest in health. 
We also find evidence that preferences play a role in single workers’ decisions to enroll 
in offered coverage.  For the two direct preference measures, we find that single individuals who 
have weak preferences based on ‘healthy, don’t need coverage’ are 5.87 percentage points less 
likely to enroll than those with strong preferences, while those stating that ‘health insurance is 
not worth the cost’ are 5.93 percentage points less likely.  Note that these changes represent 6.48 
and 6.55 percent reductions in the baseline take-up rate of 90.6 percent.  Single workers with 
uncertain preferences based on either the ‘don’t need insurance’ or ‘too costly’ preference 
measures are, respectively, 3.74 and 3.19 percentage points less likely to enroll than those with 
strong preferences (both coefficients are significant at p < 0.10).  Finally, we find that single 
workers who sometimes and never wear seatbelts are less likely than those who always do to 
enroll.  
The logit results for all specifications reveal that young adults aged 18 to 24 are less 
likely to enroll in offered coverage than those 40 to 54.  We also find that single-workers 
predicted to be eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP coverage are roughly 14.5 percentage points less 
likely to enroll compared to those predicted to be ineligible. Affordability also appears to be an 
impediment to enrollment as those who are poor or near-poor, low, or middle income are less 
likely to enroll than single workers with high incomes.  We also find that college graduates or 
those with some college (p < .10 for some college) are more likely to enroll than those with less 
education.  Finally, we find that higher employee out-of-pocket premium payments for single  
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coverage are associated with a lower likelihood of enrollment. However, coefficient estimates 
are not precisely estimated and fail to obtain statistical significance in all specifications.
19 
 We fit separate equations for each of the preference measures to avoid any problems 
associated with correlation among these measures. When the preference variables are omitted 
from each of the offer and enrollment equations, we find negligible changes in the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the remaining demographic, health status, income, and premium 
variables.  This comparison suggests that variables directly assessing preferences for coverage 
independently account for differences in the demand for ESI and that demographic and health 
status variables may be capturing other factors associated with the ease of access to jobs with 
coverage or with an individual￿s expected use of health services.  This finding is also consistent 
with the weak contribution of demographic characteristics in explaining variation in preferences 
in multinominal logit models of preferences (results available upon request). 
Married couples 
Results for married couples, displayed in Table 4, also indicate that weak or uncertain 
preferences for health insurance affect job offer and take-up decisions.  In these equations, we 
specify preferences through several dummy variables indicating whether the couple has weak 
preferences (both spouses); whether the couple has uncertain preferences (both spouses); and 
whether couples have mixed preferences using the following combinations: weak/strong 
                                                 
19 In part, our failure to obtain statistically significant premium effects may  reflect our method 
of constructing the premium variable. Since premiums faced by individual workers are not 
available from the MEPS household data, our use of geographic averages reduces the variation in 
premiums across such observations, eliminating the possibility that some workers may face zero 
out-of-pocket premiums  As we report below, our premium effects are more precisely estimated 
for married couples. Results for married couples are significant at p < 0.10 or better but attain 
significance at the 0.05 level for only one specification (using the ' take risk'  preference measure).  
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preferences, weak/uncertain preferences, or strong/uncertain preferences.  The reference group 
consists of couples with strong preferences for health insurance. 
We find that couples reporting uncertain preferences in response to the ‘healthy, don’t 
need coverage’ statement are 14.03 percentage points less likely to obtain jobs with health 
insurance compared to couples who both report strong preferences. Since the baseline offer rate 
is 92.1 percent, the marginal effects correspond closely to their percent impact on this rate.  
Additionally, we find that couples with a combination of weak/strong preferences are also 4.32 
percentage points less likely to obtain job offers with insurance and that those reporting a 
combination of uncertain and strong preferences are 5.43 percentage points less likely to obtain 
such offers.  Further examining the impact of mixed preferences (regressions not shown), we 
find that the statistical significance of the former result is driven by the weak preferences of the 
wife while that of the latter reflects the husband’s uncertain preferences.  
Using the ‘not worth the cost’ statement, we find households with both spouses reporting 
weak preferences to be 2.89 percentage points less likely to obtain job offers with coverage 
(coefficient significant at p <0.10), while those where both report uncertain preferences are 6.23 
percentage points less likely. We also find couples with a combination of weak/uncertain 
preferences to be 6.93 percentage points less likely to obtain a job offer with coverage, while 
those with a combination of weak and strong preferences are 3.67 percentage points less likely.  
For the latter combination, we lack the statistical power to determine which spouse is driving the 
decision. Finally, in response to the ‘take risk’ statement, we find that when both spouses report 
being risk takers, the couple is 11.91 percentage points less likely to obtain a job offering 
coverage than couples where both spouses are not risk takers.   
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  Finally, using another indirect measure of risk-taking attitudes, we find that couples who 
never use seatbelts are 15.27 percentage points less likely to obtain a job offer with health 
insurance (from the ‘healthy, don’t need coverage specification’) compared to those who report 
that they always wear seatbelts. Similar results are obtained in the other specifications.  
Our specifications also reveal that a limited number of other variables display statistical 
significance and are consistent with the underlying job sorting model.  Across all specifications, 
we find evidence that couples in counties with higher unemployment rates are less likely to 
obtain job offers with coverage. Similar to single workers, couples with higher educational 
attainment are more likely to obtain a job offer with coverage as their enhanced human capital is 
likely to facilitate job search for this employment-related benefit.  Our findings also reveal that 
across specifications, households in which children or a parent are predicted to be eligible for 
Medicaid/SCHIP are less likely to obtain job offers with coverage, yielding a reduction in this 
probability of 2.69 percentage points for an additional eligible child and 6.83 percentage points if 
a parent is eligible (results using ‘healthy, don’t need coverage’). Finally, we find that 
households in which the MEPS SAQ questionnaire was administered in Spanish are less likely to 
obtain job offers with ESI.   
Turning to enrollment decisions, we find that households in which both spouses report 
weak preferences for coverage in response to ‘healthy, don’t need coverage’ or both report 
uncertain preferences are 4.33  and 4.75 percentage points less likely to take up offered coverage 
(the former variable is significant at p < 0.10). Since the baseline take up rate for married couples 
is quite high (96.2 percent), these marginal effects correspond closely to their percent reduction 
in the likelihood of enrollment. We also find that when both spouses report  uncertain  
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preferences for coverage in response to the ‘too costly measure’, the likelihood of enrollment 
declines by 3.47 percentage points and when couples report a combination of weak and uncertain 
preferences the likelihood of enrollment declines by 3.79 percentage points. Couples with a mix 
of weak and strong preferences (coefficient significant at p < 0.10) are 2.56 percentage points 
less likely to enroll than couples where both spouses report strong preferences (a result driven by 
the husband’s weak preferences for coverage, p < .10). 
 Estimated coefficients on employee contributions to single premiums on enrollment by 
couples are more precisely estimated than for single workers. In each equation, premium effects 
are negative and statistically significant at least at p < 0.10.  Using ‘healthy, don’t need 
insurance’ as the preference measure, we find that a $100 increase in employee premium 
contributions reduces the probability of enrollment by 0.598 percentage points (similar results 
are obtained for specifications using other preference variables).  
As noted earlier, the ratio of the marginal effect on enrollment from a $1 change in the 
out-of-pocket premium to the effect of not having strong preferences can be used to compute the 
premium subsidy necessary to offset the reduction in enrollment due to weak or uncertain 
preferences. Applying the marginal effects for premiums and for preferences using the ‘healthy 
don’t need coverage’ measure, we estimate that a subsidy of $768 would be required to 
compensate couples for the loss of utility associated with enrolling in health insurance when both 
spouses have weak preferences for coverage, and a subsidy of $844 would be required for 
households where both spouses have uncertain preferences. By comparison, using estimates from 
the ‘too costly’ specification, we find that a subsidy of $579 would be required when both have 
uncertain preferences.  Comparable to the latter estimate, we estimate a subsidy of $633 for  
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couples with a combination of weak and uncertain preferences.  Finally, note that the differences 
in subsidy estimates primarily reflect differences in the magnitude of the marginal impact of the 
different preference measures across the specifications. 
Finally, as with single workers, we also find evidence in all specifications that 
affordability may be an impediment to enrollment as poor/near poor, low income, and middle 
income couples are less likely to enroll in offered coverage than those with high incomes. In all 
specifications, couples with children eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP or who are themselves eligible 
are less likely to enroll in ESI. Having an additional child eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP or a 
parent eligible reduces the likelihood of take up by 1.58 and 5.34 percentage points, respectively.  
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications 
Concern over the weak response by the uninsured to initiatives encouraging voluntary 
enrollment in health insurance has led policymakers and researchers to question whether the 
uninsured value health insurance and, thus, whether policy initiatives ought to foster an 
awareness of the value of coverage.  In this paper, we have addressed this issue by examining the 
role played by preferences for health insurance in decisions by individuals and married couples 
to seek out and enroll in ESI.  Our descriptive tabulations reveal that adults with weak or 
uncertain preferences for coverage are more likely to be uninsured than those reporting strong 
preferences.  Our econometric work also reveals that single workers and married couples with 
weak or uncertain preferences are less likely to obtain jobs with health insurance than those with 
strong preferences. These findings are consistent with earlier work on job sorting for single 
workers (Monheit and Vistnes, 1999).  We also find evidence that single workers and married  
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couples with weak or uncertain preferences are also less likely to take up offered coverage.  
 Since our estimated premium coefficients for single workers are not statistically 
significant, we cannot provide estimates of the premium subsidy for this group to compensate 
them for the disutility associated with enrollment in offered coverage.  Our estimates of the 
premium subsidy necessary to compensate married couples generally exceed the minimum out-
of-pocket premium costs necessary to obtain any health insurance coverage (i.e., single 
coverage). We also find that affordability of coverage is likely to be a factor in enrollment 
decisions as individuals and families with incomes less than four times the federal poverty line 
are less likely to enroll than those with high family incomes. Finally, we find little change in the 
contribution of demographic and health-related characteristics when the preferences are omitted 
from the specifications. 
Our findings also suggest that persons with weak and uncertain preferences for coverage 
represent a sizeable portion of the workers who were uninsured throughout 2001.  Among 
workers aged 18-54 who were uninsured all year, 31.4 percent reported weak or uncertain 
preferences in response to ‘healthy, don’t need coverage,’ and 54.6 percent reported weak or 
uncertain preferences in response to the ‘not worth the cost’ measure.
 20   However, our findings 
should not be interpreted as ignoring the importance of ability to pay as impeding enrollment in 
ESI.  Among uninsured workers ages 18-54, those with weak preferences tend to be 
economically vulnerable. Three-quarters have completed 12 years of schooling or less and 49.8 
                                                 
20 As noted above, since we exclude proxy respondents, our estimates cannot be 
considered nationally representative.  However, our examination of samples with and without 
proxy respondents revealed only small differences in selected demographic characteristics.  
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percent have incomes less than twice the poverty line.
21  
Our findings suggest that there may be a considerable gap between the perceptions of 
policymakers and some of the uninsured regarding the social and private value of health 
insurance.  The equity and efficiency considerations noted in our introductory section may not 
resonate with some of the uninsured.  Apart from human capital considerations, such individuals 
with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance select jobs without coverage, perhaps 
valuing wage income with certainty over the uncertain yield of health insurance benefits, 
especially when the latter entails out-of-pocket premium contributions, deductibles and co-
payments, and excludes valued services or restricts the choice of providers.  
Finally, our results also shed light on the relative merits of encouraging enrollment 
through mandatory versus voluntary approaches.  As regards the former, our findings suggest 
that some of the uninsured are likely to experience welfare losses should mandatory provision of 
health insurance benefits be imposed without premium or income subsidies to offset required 
premium contributions.  Alternatively, our finding that weak/uncertain preferences reduce the 
likelihood of enrollment for some workers, apart from considerations of income, suggests that 
reliance on ‘voluntarism’ should also be accompanied by educational efforts to inform targeted 
uninsured groups about the merits of health insurance.  Such educational efforts should not 
merely be restricted to informing targeted groups about the presence of a new program, but 
provide more generic information regarding the purpose of health insurance, its attendant costs, 
and its likely impact on improving timely access to services and the quality and continuity of 
                                                 
21 These tabulations are based upon responses to ‘healthy, don’t need coverage’ and 
estimates are nearly identical when responses to the ‘not worth the cost measure’ are used.   
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care.  Such an information exchange might focus on health plan design, soliciting feedback on 
valued benefits or aggressively marketing low-cost catastrophic coverage to the young and 
unmarried.  Thus, a dual approach which would provide a combination of subsidies and 
educational efforts to those most likely to exhibit weak or uncertain preferences for coverage 
might prove more effective than one limited to either component.  
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Table 1. Uninsured persons and health insurance preferences, 2001. 
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Table 2. Percentage of single persons and couples who are offered health insurance and 
take up offered coverage according to health insurance preferences. 
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Source: MEPS-Household Component, 2001. *, **, *** Indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Other variables in the models are described in Section III of the paper.    
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Source: MEPS-Household Component, 2001.   *, **, *** Indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  Other variables in the models are described in Section III of the paper.  